Hard Habits to Break: Information and Mutual Mistrust in the Regulation of Corporate Polluters by Niles, David A.
Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 
Volume 1 Number 1 Article 4 
4-1-1993 
Hard Habits to Break: Information and Mutual Mistrust in the 
Regulation of Corporate Polluters 
David A. Niles 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/belj 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David A. Niles, Hard Habits to Break: Information and Mutual Mistrust in the Regulation of Corporate 
Polluters, 1 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 149 (1993). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/belj/vol1/iss1/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Environmental Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
HARD HABITS TO BREAK: INFORMATION
AND MUTUAL MISTRUST IN THE
REGULATION OF CORPORATE
POLLUTERS
DAVID A. NiLEs*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .................................... 150
II. The Importance of Accurate Information to Cooperative and
Adversarial Theories of Regulation ................... 151
A. Informational Assumptions of Deterrence Theory ..... 152
B. The Role of Accurate Information in Cooperative
Regulation .................................. 153
III. Methods of Extracting Information from Polluters in the
United States ................................... 157
A. Joint Federal-State Legislation .................. 157
B. Laws that Make Corporations Learn: The
Right-to-Know ............................... 164
C. The Securities Exchange Acts: An Unutilized
Source of Corporate Duties to Reveal Information
About Pollution Practices ....................... 166
D. The Common Law: A Limited Source of Duties to
Disclose Environmental Hazards ................. 168
E. Professional Ethics: The Corporate Professional's
Lips Are Sealed .............................. 169
IV. Environmental Auditing: The Increasingly Voluntary
Performance of Environmental Research ............... 170
V. Conclusion ..................................... 171
"Nam et ipsa scientia potestas est." [Knowledge is power.]
Sir Francis Bacon, Meditationes Sacrae De Haeresibus, 1597.
* J.D., University at Buffalo School of Law, May 1992.
149
150 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Knowledge is the most fundamental element of successful pollution
control. At the outset, accurate information regarding pollution's threat
to social welfare is necessary to identify the need for, and generate
interest in, regulation. It is, therefore, imperative that knowledge
concerning pollution behavior is available before appropriate regulations
can be developed. However, the role of accurate information is often
understated or ignored in theoretical discussions. It is important to
understand how information, or the lack thereof, has affected past
regulatory schemes, hinders present regimes, and suggests future
alternatives. This paper assesses the role of information in the
regulation of corporate polluting practices.2
Despite the emergence of a significant body of regulatory theory,
which criticizes and poses alternatives to the adversarial regulation of
corporate actors,3 the history of American environmental regulation is
1. Often the level of pollution of a given type must reach crisis proportions before
it is addressed. See CYNTHIA H. ENLOE, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 24-26 (1975). Despite a long history of smoke-filled air,
Britain did not pass its Clean Air Act until well after the "smog" incident of 1952,
during which a temperature inversion caused soot from a variety of sources to cast
a pall of significant proportions over London's skyline. Public outcry to initial
government inaction occurred only after the release of statistics linking illness and
fatalities to the incident. Similarly, the now widely publicized problem of smog in the
Los Angeles metropolitan area was attacked by local regulation after Californians
took stock of recurring "smog episodes" in the post-World War II period. See Errol
Meidinger, Marketing Pollution: The Social Construction of "Emissions Trading" in
U.S. Air Pollution Regulation, [hereinafter Marketing Pollution] (1990) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Buffalo Environmental Law Journal). Crises act as
catalyzing events which match perceived threats to the environment with societal
values of public and environmental health, helping environmental problems receive
political attention or "issueness." ENLOE, supra at 12-13.
2. Municipal polluters are governmental instruments and are presumably bound
to act in the public interest. Therefore, governmental polluters present different
theoretical problems to the regulator than corporate polluters. Historically,
municipal polluters have been given various immunities from liability and
exemptions from regulations to avoid placing municipalities in financial jeopardy or
administrative deadlock. These two differences between public and private polluters
introduce complexities which are beyond the scope of this paper.
3. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 22-35 (1992)
[hereinafter RESPONSIVE REGULATION]; Marketing Pollution, supra note 1; BARRY
BOYER ET AL., UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE pt. I, at 2-4 (final draft 1987)
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largely a saga of repeatedly ineffective "command and control"
regulation.' Regulation has hitherto been premised on ingrained
conceptions of a corporation as a one dimensional actor seeking to
maximize profits5 and cannot be trusted to be truthful about its
operations and its harmful effects on society.6 While the Toxic
Substance Control Act of 1976' reflects a departure from the rigid
distrust of corporate behavior embodied in earlier statutes, it is unlikely
that the United States will stray far from the classic command and
control model of environmental regulation to one that includes greater
cooperation. These beliefs about the proper relationship between the
government and the private sector have ramifications for both command-
centered and cooperative regulatory regimes.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE INFORMATION TO COOPERATIVE
AND ADVERSARIAL THEORIES OF REGULATION
While the methods of pollution control are no longer viewed as a
limited choice between command and control and cooperative
regulations,' the various theories of regulation seem to fit onto a
[hereinafter THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES] (available from the Regulatory Innovations
Staff, Office of Policy, Planning & Evaluation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Washington D.C.).
4. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, pt. I, at 1; Todd Edwards & Tapio
Kuusinan, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Strategies for Improving Industrial
Environmental Compliance (Dec. 1989) [hereinafter Strategies] (a draft report
available from the Regulatory Innovations Staff of the Office of Policy, Planning and
Evaluation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington D.C.).
5. RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 3, at 21.
6. Distrust of corporate management has been met with disclosure rights and
duties of management-to-board and management-to-stockholder. Presumably greater
information about managers' behavior in the hands of an independent or at least
skeptical board of directors will help prevent fraud. See Alfred F. Conard, Reflections
on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941, 959-60 (1977); cf LEWIS D.
SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 295-301 (1988) (discussing a
shareholder's right of inspection of business records in part to prevent the dissipation
of corporate assets through fraud or mismanagement).
7. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988)).
8. See RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 3, at 20-30 (discussing "responsive
regulation" or regulatory schemes under which regulators are allowed flexibility to
apply highly graduated punishments to higher levels of noncompliance); THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, pt. I, at 2-4 (discussing the regulation of corporate
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continuum between these two extremes. These newer models all contain
elements of coercion and cooperative trust which reflect assumptions
about the information available to both the regulator and the regulatee
under those models.9
A. Informational Assumptions of Deterrence Theory
The classic command and control model rests on a deterrence
theory-a fundamental assumption that compliance with set
environmental policy is promoted when the costs of noncompliance to the
corporate actor exceed the benefits derived from noncompliance. 0
Prohibited polluting behavior to be deterred by civil fines" and possible
criminal sanctions, 2 which would raise the costs of violating these
prohibitions beyond the value of the conceivable benefits (i.e., cheaper
production through the exploitation of environmental resources). This
cost-benefit mechanism can be successful only if accurate information is
available to the regulator and the regulatee.
In order to create a realistic deterrent to undesirable corporate
behavior, the regulator must have an accurate view of the regulatee's
cost structure. The level of fines or criminal sanctions must be high
behavior by manipulating and appealing to the values found in the "cultures" of the
corporation itself and larger society); Strategies, supra note 4, at 3-4 (discussing an
approach which integrates the knowledge of various fields including economics,
sociology, criminology, psychology and law).
9. See generally RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 3; THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3.
10. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, pt. I, at 2. See also Gary S.
Becher, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)
(discussing the optimal economic policies to combat illegal behavior).
11. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No.
92-500, § 309(d), 86 Stat. 816, 860 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988)); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988)).
12. These are generally applied only for willful violations of pollution restrictions
or reporting requirements. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c). However, criminal sanctions are
infrequently applied pursuant to the statutes which authorize them. See David McN.
Olds et al., Thoughts on the Role of Penalties in the Enforcement of the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts, 17 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 26 (1978-1979).
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enough to affect the life blood of a corporation, the balance sheet.'" If
penalties are too low in relation to the net benefits of noncompliance,
pollution fines will be "expensed" or budgeted as the price of the
polluting behavior. 4 Similarly, the regulated polluter must have
information regarding the likelihood of enforcement in order to plan its
behavior." In order for the optimal amount of regulation to occur, this
likelihood of punishment must be proportional to the actual risk of harm
to society of the prohibited behavior.
B. The Role of Accurate Information in Cooperative Regulation
Authors Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite propose several
alternative models to command and control legislation under the general
rubric of "responsive regulation."' 6 Specifically, Ayres and Braithwaite
recommend responsive "tit-for-tat" (TFT) enforcement,"7 tripartism, s
and enforced self-regulation 9 as possible alternatives to deterrence-
based regulation. Each of these theories contain assumptions which
render them dependent on the accuracy of information available to all
parties involved.
TFT enforcement is a synergy of punishment and persuasion under
which strategic use of punitive sanctions increases the persuasive weight
of recommendations for corporate behavior. Persuasion legitimatizes
and lends an aura of fairness to the use of sanctions to deter future
13. See RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 3, at 19, 43-46 (discussing the need
for forceful and credible punishment which is only rarely applied).
14. See GUNTHER STEPHEN, POLLUTION CONTROL, ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND
LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM 9 (1989). It may also be possible that a firm may take
advantage of poorly tailored regulations and methods of damage measurement to
achieve large economic benefits from polluting and pay a grossly underestimated
punishment fee. See RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 3, at 36-37.
15. See RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 3, at 29-30.
16. Responsive regulation uses escalating forms of government intervention, the
severity of which is closely matched to the severity of harm to be punished, in order
to promote less intrusive market oriented methods of control. RESPONSIVE
REGULATION, supra note 3, at 4-5.
17. See id. at 19-52.
18. See id. at 54-100.
19. See id. at 101-32.
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wrongdoing.20 Because the marktplace is populated by both rational
and irrational actors,21 a pyramidal enforcement hierarchy is necessary
which applies punishments ranging from widely used "persuasive"
measures at the bottom of the regulatory pyramid to the seldom used
"incapacitative" punishments at the top of the pyramid.' The TFT
model appeals to the different motivations which may influence any
given polluter. Persuasive methods address the non-economic interests
which the corporation may have such as a desire to be well-liked by the
public and a sense of civic responsibility, rather than mercenary
interests such as avoidance of punishment.'
For such responsive regulation to work, both the regulator and the
regulated must possess reasonable assessments of their respective
interests. The regulator must understand the regulatee in order to
judge whether persuasion or punishment will succeed in obtaining the
desired behavior. The corporation must acknowledge its interests within
the TFr model. It must understand the credibility or likelihood of
punishment and the gains to be reaped from voluntary compliance with
the regulations. An accurate understanding of the societal costs of
violation, and the subtle ways in which productivity may be thereby
reduced, would help persuade polluters into greater compliance.24
Under the theory of tripartite regulation, a responsive regulatory
framework such as that described above is supplemented by the
introduction of a third-party to the regulatory scheme, Public Interest
Groups (PIGs). The involvement of PIGs is designed to prevent the
regulator and the regulated corporations from entering a marriage of
convenience which would result in a less than socially optimal degree of
20. Id. at 25-36.
21. Id. at 30.
22. Id. at 35-36. Ascension of the regulatory pyramid is justified when the
violator of environmental standards is grossly negligent, intransigent or willful, and
commits continuous violations. See id. at 35-53.
23. Id. at 31-42.
24. If wider social costs were properly accounted for, corporate polluters would
also achieve a truer picture of the cost of pollution to their own productivity. Sick
workers are less productive than healthy ones. The useful life of production
equipment is also lessened by pollution related damage such as corrosion due to
acidic discharges and particulate matter as they descend from the atmosphere. This
damage has been estimated to reach the tens of millions of dollars annually. (This
figure does not include an estimate of the cost of damage related to
chlorofluorocarbons and ozone depletion.) See G. TYLER MILLER, LIVING IN THE
ENVIRONMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 439 (5th ed. 1988).
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regulation.25 This type of inefficient and undesirable situation occurs
when the regulator sees ease of enforcement as superior to the
achievement of environmental goals which results in a reduction in the
frequency and severity of punishment.' Possessing the same
information as regulators, third party interests can press regulators to
apply discretionary punishments in pursuit of an optimal level of
pollution control.'
Under an enforced "self-regulation" model, the state would
promulgate general guidelines within which the regulated industries
could write their own compliance standards.' One of the rationales
behind self-regulation is that environmental monitors, who are either
part of the private regulated industry or are closely affiliated with it,
will be more knowledgeable of production practices, their effects on the
environment, and how to best mitigate those effects.' In the enforced
25. Id. at 54-55. At times, it is impossible to distinguish purely public or purely
private "interest." Multiple motives such as pecuniary interests or citizenship
interests are often inextricably linked. Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A
Theoretical Outline, 9 LAW & POLICY 355, 366 (1987). Indeed it is impossible for an
individual to so categorize his or her own interests with certainty. See IMMANUEL
KANT, THE GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H.J. Paton, trans. 1964).
However, as Ayres & Braithwaite argue, a party can be sufficiently removed from the
regulatory process to render capture unlikely. RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note
3, at 77-78.
26. Although capture theory has been rejected as overly simplistic, American
regulatory history is replete with instances of capture. After the establishment of the
United States Forest Service by the United States Department of Agriculture,
rangers in the field became less advocates of federal land protection and more
lobbyists for their assigned regions' interests. See HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST
RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 75-80 (1960). Similar phenomena
occurred in the regulation of utilities and common carriers which were regulated by
allegedly independent agencies. See Marketing Pollution, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 14;
see, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the
Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952).
27. RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 3, at 95-96.
28. This regulatory framework is sometimes called "co-regulation." See
RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 3, at 102.
29. Id. at 104-06. Present federal pollution acts do rely heavily on information
supplied directly by the regulatees in satisfaction of monitoring and reporting
requirements. See infra text accompanying notes 34-64. However, true self-
regulation has not been used in the realm of pollution control in the United States.
The closest we have come to self-regulation in the United States is the largely
voluntary adherence by large corporations to Generally Accepted Accounting
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self-regulation regime, it is vital that companies reveal the true extent
of their polluting behavior so that enforcement penalties provide realistic
incentives for compliance.'
Even if polluters attempt to fully comply with all applicable
pollution laws in good faith, those laws will achieve a socially beneficial
level of pollution control only insofar as they reflect the true risks to
health and environment represented by pollution. Damage to the
environment translates into many costs which are external to the cost
structure of polluting companies. 1  Environmental regulation is
effective insofar as it causes polluters to internalize the costs linked with
damage to the environment-the true social cost of their behavior to
society.
2
Accurate information on the effects of production practices is
necessary not only to construct effective environmental policy, but also
to promote proportional and reasonable application of available
sanctions. In fact, the lack of accurate information on the true effects
of toxicity and health dangers has been cited as the primary handicap
to the determination of the true risks involved in production practices
and in crafting effective legislation.' The United States has relied
primarily on adversarial means of obtaining such information in the
legislative process.
Principles (GAAP) and the Federal Communications Commission's delegation of
screening of music that promotes drug use to local radio stations. See RESPONSIVE
REGULATION, supra note 3, at 157-58, 176. See also Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, § 101(c), 91 Stat. 1290, 1294 (codified at 30 U.S.C.
§ 811(c) (1988)) (allowing mining operators to submit their own substitute methods
of reaching compliance which may be implemented in lieu of the prescribed safety
procedures required by the Act if the Secretary of the Interior so approves);
REsPo sIvE REGULATION, supra note 3, at 175.
30. See supra text accompanying note 14.
31. Pollution is an externality because it is generated through the production
processes of manufacturers, who profit therefrom, but who do not bear the economic
costs to others resulting from health damage and lost enjoyment of both private and
public property. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICY 621-22 (3d ed. 1985).
32. Id. at 623-24. Cf. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347-48 (May 1967) (discussing property rights in common
resources such as land, air and water as means of promoting internalization of use
costs).
33. Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH L. REV. 1795, 1796 (1989).
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III. METHODS OF EXTRACTING INFORMATION FROM POLLUTERS IN THE
UNITED STATES
Government regulators have extracted information from corporate
actors regarding their production practices through a finite number of
common law duties and sometimes overlapping legislative programs.
These include principles of tort and contract law, state legislation, and
joint state and federal regulatory schemes. Over time, industry has
begun to obtain greater amounts of information than required by law for
its own internal use through environmental audits. While principles of
"good management" are increasingly taking cognizance of environmental
needs, it is unlikely that the information gathered will be made
available to regulators or the public due to economic disincentives for
corporations at this time.
A. Joint Federal-State Legislation
Modern federal pollution statutes have attempted to replace a
hodgepodge of state health and public safety laws governing the
handling of materials that are potentially hazardous to human health
in residential areas and on navigable waters.' The National
34. See MILLER, supra note 24, at 483 (discussing the evolution of water pollution
control in the United States). For example, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA) was originally passed in 1948 with a narrow definition of "interstate
waters" over which the Federal government would assert a degree of regulatory
control; however, the primary responsibility for regulation of dumping into water
bodies would lie with the states. See F.W.P.C.A., Pub L. No. 80-845, § 2(dX1), 62
Stat. 1155, 1156 (1948). See also Frank J. Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement
Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in
Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1103, 1112-28 (1970). Water
bodies not covered by the Federal Act were left to the complete control of the states.
Prior to the enactment of FWPCA, water bodies were covered by a web of poorly
coordinated common law and statutes. The common law protected the riparian rights
of those living along a stream to have water "free from contamination and without
loss or diminution in quantity." PROGRESS REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
POLLUTION ABATEMENT, N.Y. LEGIs. Doc. No. 59, TO THE LEGISLATURE OF 1947, 32
(1947). Section 213 of the New York Conservation Law prohibited factories from
polluting or obstructing a stream, while section 176 made any violation a
misdemeanor and imposed fines. Id. at 32. Sections 76 to 85 of the N.Y. Public
Health Law contained directives not to pollute, but these had little effect due to the
ease of obtaining exemptions from the State Commissioner of Health. Id. at 31, 36-
40; cf. Marketing Pollution, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 10-16 (discussing the evolution of
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Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)35 gave most environmental
administrative authority to the Administrator of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). NEPA empowered the EPA
Administrator to obtain information from potential polluters as a
condition prior to permitting or licensing polluting practices.
Information is gathered through provisions which require: (1) periodic
performance reporting, (2) record keeping, (3) notification and reports of
problems and emergencies, (4) compliance and noncompliance reports,
and (5) general notification requirements.'
Several statutes such as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1948 (FWPCA),3 7 the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),' the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),"9 and the Clean Air
Act of 1977 (CAA)40 authorize the EPA to require inspections and
reporting in order to allow the EPA to develop standards, monitor
procedures, and gather information which is reasonably relevant to the
purposes of the individual Acts.
4 1
Records of all toxic waste produced by a facility are required prior
to granting permission for polluting activities and are to be kept subject
to production upon request by the EPA or state regulators. For example,
municipal air pollution regulation).
35. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4331-
4370).
36. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, DUTIES TO REPORT OR DISCLOSE INFORMATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL
ASPECTS OF BUSINESS ACTIVITIES (Sep. 1984, revised Sep. 1985) [hereinafter DUTIES]
(prepared for the Regulatory Reform Staff of the Environmental Protection Agency).
37. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 stat. 896 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1988)).
38. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9657 (1988)).
39. Pub L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6991 (1988)).
40. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)).
41. Under § 1318 of FWPCA, the Administrator has the power to require, "the
owner or operator of any point source to (i) establish and maintain such records, (ii)
make such reports, (iii) install, use and maintain such monitoring equipment or
methods.... (iv) sample such effluents. . ., and (v) provide such information as he
may reasonably require..." 33 U.S.C. § 1318. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9603; 42 U.S.C.
§ 7414; 42 U.S.C. § 6927(bXl).
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FWPCA requires that all data used to prepare any report, such as
emergency spill reports,42 must be kept for three "s Similar provisions
are found in CERCLA,44 CAA, 45 and RCRA48 .
In an effort to gauge the continued compliance or non-compliance
of polluters with the required environmental data, the EPA has used its
monitoring authority to require, where applicable, periodic reporting of
emissions or discharges into the air4? 7 or water4 8 and deposits into
storage facilities.49 Each statute contains the threat of possible civil
and criminal sanctions for non-compliance,' and such sanctions are at
42. Section 311 of the FWPCA mandates that discharges of oil and hazardous
substances in excess of prescribed quantities must be reported to the appropriate
federal agency (usually the Coast Guard's National Response Center). Duties, supra
note 36, at 19. See 33 C.F.R. § 153.201 (1991); 40 C.F.R. § 300.51(b) (1991).
43. 40 C.F.R. § 403.12(n) (1991). State and local authorities may require strict
reporting and record keeping procedures than those required by the federal
government. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.4 (1991).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (requiring every facility that treats or stores hazardous
waste to hold records for 50 years containing the location, title, and conditions of the
facility, as well as the identity, quantity, and quality of substances which were stored
there).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7414, 7452, 7611 (requiring stationary sources of air pollution
to keep monitoring records including information on start-ups, shut-downs,
malfunctions of control equipment, and periods of no monitoring).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924, 6927, 6934, 6991(d) (requiring any records of waste tests
or shipping manifests to be kept for three years).
47. DUTIES, supra note 36, at 35. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.110(aX6) (1991) (State
Implementation Programs (SIPs) require polluters keep records of emissions).
48. 40 C.F.R. § 403.12(e) (1991) (requiring Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs)
to be submitted to the permitting authority, often a state agency, at intervals
specified in the discharger's permit; DMRs must summarize the content of effluent
discharges, required flow measurements, and sample collections for laboratory
analysis).
49. Necessary reports include biannual reports by generators of all hazardous
waste shipments, including amount, type, and destination. Treatment, Storage, or
Disposal (TSD) facilities must periodically report the amount of hazardous waste
received and may include the method of treatment, storage or disposal. Permitted
facilities must also submit risk assessment reports which estimate possibilities of
human exposure. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-25, 6927. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.41, 262.75 (1991).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (giving the Administrator of the EPA discretion to initiate
civil actions or criminal proceedings under FWPCA, and requiring the Administrator
to-issue notices to violators and the appropriate state regulatory authority).
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the discretion of local regulators5 and the EPA Administrator.52
In addition to compelling the production of necessary information,
these state and federal statutes require public and private polluters to
notify the relevant authorities of problems with meeting quality
standards and emergency leaks or spills in the interest of protecting
public health. Information on emergency health hazards is channeled
by the FWPCA,5 CERCLA, and RCRA to the National Response
51. The ability of a state to veto the application of FWPCA was restricted by the
addition of the U.S. Attorney General's power to act at the behest of a state affected
by interstate pollution rather than only at the request of the state in which the
pollution originated. See BARRY, supra note 34, at 1113. Yet, the discretion of state
officials still plays an important role in FWPCA. The 1961 Amendments required the
governor unilaterally, or the municipality with permission from the governor and the
state water pollution agency, to request federal involvement before review of pollution
activity in interstate waters would be triggered. See id. at 1114. Section 21 of the
1977 Amendment allows states to veto federal permits when the potential pollution
harm from the permitted project is deemed unacceptable. Id. at 1125-27 (lauding this
"selective preemption" of the power of the Secretary as allowing proper flexibility
which recognizes the differences among the various states).
52. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1370-71; 42 U.S.C. § 9658; 42 U.S.C. § 6902(7). The
Administrator of the EPA (or in some cases the Secretary of the Interior) may simply
issue loose regulations. This may occur even in the wake of previous, more stringent
regulations as long as the change is not "inconsistent" with the empowering act. For
example, the laissez faire attitude of the Reagan Administration towards
environmental regulation was successfully reflected through CAA when the
Administrator of the EPA loosened the threshold requirements for "netting" on non-
attainment areas after reversing its own past positions. The Supreme Court upheld
and significantly shielded this use of discretion from further judicial scrutiny.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). %
MARKETING POLLUTION, supra note 1, Ch. 4, at 28-32. These efforts can, however, be
thwarted. For example, within the CAA, § 202 allows no discretion with regard to
setting automobile standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411-7416. MARKETING POLLUTION,
supra note 1, ch. 3, at 15. Notwithstanding this fact, inspectors and local regulators,
in any sort of semi-prosecutorial setting, have the discretion simply not to report
their findings. See supra at notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
53. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(mX3) (1991) (requiring verbal notification to the
permitting agency or National Response Center within 24 hours of bypasses under
the NPDES Permits). See also 40 C.F.R. § 403 (1991) (requiring the reporting of
waste loads which are likely to jeopardize the compliance of a publicly owned
treatment works).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (requiring that the National Response Center be notified
immediately when a responsible party learns of any release of a hazardous substance,
including toxic air emissions).
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Center.
The EPA and authorized state regulatory bodies may also compel
reports in their enforcement and nonenforcement oversight capacities.
In a nonenforcement context, additional reports may be requested to
supplement information required before issuing a permit for a given
activity' or to clarify information relevant to handling
requirements. 7 The CAA also empowers the EPA and the local
administrator to supplement notices of alterations in plant operations
or activities which may increase the emission rate of air pollutants. 8
Reports may also be compelled under these state and federal
statutes in order to assist agencies in determining compliance or
noncompliance. Under CERCLA and FWPCA, reports which verify
continued compliance with discharge requirements 9 and water effluent
limitations" may be requested as necessary. CAA and RCRA allow the
Administrator of the EPA to obtain from source polluters and Treatment
Storage or Disposal (TSD) operators any and all information that is
necessary to evaluate the risks involved in a departure from previously
approved production and storage practices.6' The power to require
55. Exception reports must be submitted if a manifest is not returned within 45
days to the generator. A transporter must also report any release to the National
Response Center. In an emergency at a facility, notification must first be given to
local officials and then to the National Response Center. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-25. See
also DUTIES, supra note 36, at 12.
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (providing that agencies may request supplemental
information on pollutant discharging practices in order to determine whether a
permit is required).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (providing that the EPA may ask for information about
the identity and quantity of waste a TSD stores, or from generators who shipped
waste to a particular facility), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6934, 6991(d); 40 C.F.R. § 262.43 (1991)
(requiring a detailed plan of waste analysis procedures used to be submitted upon
request; RCRA can also compel production of TSD log books).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7414.
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (allowing the Administrator to order reports he finds
necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment from any known
or suspected release that may occur).
60. At its discretion, the permitting agency may request reports on continued
compliance which are in addition to the periodic reports. DUTIES, supra note 36, at
7.
61. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7414, 7542; 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(n), 61.54 (1991) (requiring,
under CAA, owners and operators who propose to modify any practice which will
increase their pollutant emissions to provide information necessary to perform
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discretionary reports in these state and federal statutes fulfills dual
functions. First, the public health is protected by obtaining information
about the extent of unlicensed discharges. Second, enforcement of these
statutes is furthered by offering the threat of sudden compelled reports
which may reveal non-compliance which is subject to subsequent
sanctions. This second function is more overtly served by provisions of
these Acts which authorize surprise inspection authority.
FWPCA, CERCLA, CAA, and RCRA all attempt to promote
compliance by leaving potential polluters uncertain as to when their
operations will be scrutinized and possibly opened to liability under
federal and state statutes.6 2 In theory, polluters will be on their best
behavior at all times because they never know when their records and
their facilities will be inspected.6a
This type of command and control legislation has useful aspects.
Federal legislation has a broad reach and can affect all the members of
an industry or all the polluters of a certain type throughout the country.
The presence of federal legislation is at least a token indication that
tackling pollution is a national priority. Yet, as CAA illustrates, any
legislation which covers only an enumerated list of pollutants is
inevitably underinclusive, given the rate with which new substances are
analysis of the impact of the proposed change); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6927, 6991(b), 6991(d);
40 C.F.R. §§ 264.73, 265.73 (1991) (allowing the Administrator, under RCRA, to order
further reports based on information received from past site monitoring or in
response to purported leaks from TSD or underground tanks).
62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1318, 1321 (allowing the Administrator or any authorized
representative to inspect required records or controls at facilities at any reasonable
time); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(b), 9604(e) (giving the Administrator and state officials
power to order any investigation necessary to preserve health and safety); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7414, 7418, 7426, 7542, 7603; 42 U.S.C. §§ 6927, 6934, 6991(d) (requiring that
every facility must be inspected at least once every two years).
63. The importance of surprise is not formally recognized in the legislative
history of these Acts. However it is doubtful that Congress failed to realize the
importance of the power behind surprise inspections. See S. REP. No. 462, 80th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 3729, reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.S. 2215. This long-standing
strategy under classical deterrence theories of regulation was empirically supported
by the work of behaviorist psychologists who found that an unpredictable application
of positive or negative reinforcers produced a steadier rate of response than a
predictable application. See ANDREW B. CRIDER ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY 200-01, 207-09
(1983).
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used in production processes in the market place."
Command and control legislation has focused on specific types of
pollution and has frustrated the formulation of a comprehensive
pollution policy. If a certain type of pollution is not caught within the
regulatory web of loosely connected legislation, it may escape the reach
of regulation despite the need to control the practice for effective
environmental administration. s  Moreover, federal bureaucracy and
the attempt to make detailed standards has resulted in a cumbersome
processe with great discretion in enforcement.'7  With these
realizations in mind, legislators began to develop toxic legislation
reaching across industry boundaries.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a)-(b) (setting nationwide ambient air quality standards for
major, widespread pollutants which have adverse effects on public health or welfare).
Area-specific concentration limits are set for sulfur dioxide, heavy metals in
particulate form, carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, ozone gas and lead. Marketing
Pollution, supra note 1, ch 3, at 3-4. Because of the short-term focus of the legislative
process and its cumbersomeness, addition of toxins to such a list are slow. For
example, only two ambient standards have been added to CAA since the standards
were established by the 1977 Amendments. See Lead Industries, Inc. v. E.P.A., 647
F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); Marketing Pollution,
supra note 1, ch. 3, at 7.
65. A persistent problem in this regard is cross border pollution, pollution at the
source of forming rivers and lakes, and pollution on the high seas. See generally
Louis HENKIN 1T AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1274-75, 1317-20 (2d ed. 1987) (describing
recent attempts by the United States and the United Nations, acting independently,
to deal with the problem of transnational pollution of coastal and international
waters).
66. Despite repeated amendments to the 1948 FWPCA, multiple conferences and
hearings were required before any coercive action could be taken. Barry Boyer &
Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of
Citizen Suits under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REv. 833, 846 (1985)
[hereinafter Citizen Suits]. The enforcement process was so slow that only one case
reached the courts in two decades after FWPCA was passed. S. REP. No. 414, 92nd
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672. The doctrinal
difficulty of attaching liability to specific polluters may also have served as a
deterrent enforcement activity. Citizen Suits, supra at 838-39. For a discussion of
the many sources of delay in the FWPCA see Barry, supra note 34.
67. See supra note 52.
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B. Laws that Make Corporations Learn: The Right-to-Know
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, many states, including New
York and California, attempted to involve their citizens in the
environmental regulation process by creating right-to-know laws.'
These laws use a combination of five possible provisions consisting of,
"(1) disclosure of the identity of the chemical agent to which humans are
exposed; (2) warning of its known hazards; (3) testing to determine
hazards; (4) curtailing exposure by reducing the discharge of the
chemical; and (5) compensation for any injuries proved to be caused by
chemical exposure.""9  Right-to-know laws were first enacted at the
federal level through the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA).7° The right-to-know strategy was first
applied on a federal scale in the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (OSHA),"' which gave workers the right to know what health
hazards were present in their workplace 2 and mandated exposure
68. Lyndon, supra note 33, at 1833-34. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25180.7 (West 1992) (making failure to disclose information of illegal discharges of
hazardous waste a felony, and requiring local health officers to inform the public of
such information); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K to 13:6K (West Supp. 1992) (requiring
parties to real estate transactions to assess the toxicity of a site and arrange for
cleanup prior to closing and to secure state certification as to the adequacy of the
cleanup); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4800-4808 (McKinney 1985) (mandating ongoing
health monitoring by employers of workers exposed to toxic substances).
69. Lyndon, supra note 33, at 1856.
70. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050
(1988)). See generally Lyndon, supra note 33, at 1826 (discussing the enactment of
EPCRA).
71. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988)).
These provisions are put into effect through the OSHA Hazard Communication
Standard. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1991). Similar standards are codified pursuant to
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 40 C.F.R. §§ 370.30-370.31.
72. Section 21(c) authorizes the Secretary to "provide for the establishment and
supervision of programs for the education and training of employers and employees
in the recognition, avoidance, and prevention of unsafe or unhealthful working
conditions in employments covered by... [the Act]." 15 U.S.C. § 670. Section 6(bX7)
requires that this standard "prescribe the use of labels or other appropriate forms of
warning as are necessary to insure that employees are apprised of all hazards to
which they are exposed, relevant symptoms and appropriate emergency treatment,
and proper conditions and pre-cautions of safe use or exposure." 15 U.S.C. 655(cX7).
These provisions trace their roots to the doctrine of informed consent. Lyndon, supra
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limits for certain chemicals.73
Although right-to-know laws and federal toxin limits have been
categorized as a more "aggressive" approach to environmental protection,
the effectiveness of these laws are hindered by the trend to withhold
information from the American market-place by using generic pack-
aging.74 As a result, consumers often remain unaware of potential
hazards. 5 This is particularly true where the ingredients of a product
(especially cleansers which can contain some of the most caustic and
harmful chemicals produced) can be argued to be a protected "trade
secret." '76
Additional problems arise from a right-to-know law's use of
corporate research duties. Toxicity research does not contribute to
profitability in a direct sense and is, therefore, underproduced by the
marketplace.77 Consequently, the effectiveness of right-to-know laws
may be undermined by halfhearted participation in research caused by
note 33, at 1797.
73. See generally RICHARD DEC. HINDs & ROBERT D. MORAN, OSHA: TOXIC
SUBSTANCES IN THE WORKPLACE (1983) (discussing OSHA's authorization of the
Secretary to issue regulations which create a "standard" of safe practices and to
prescribe regulations regarding workplace exposure to toxic substances).
74. Lyndon, supra note 33, at 1796.
75. Id.
76. It is argued that the revelation of specific chemical data may reveal to
competitors practices that would defeat a business competitive advantage. Lyndon,
supra note 33, at 1855-56 n. 217-219. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-174(m) (1989)
(defining a trade secret as "any formula, plan, pattern, device, process, production
information ... which is not patented... and which is used or developed for use in
the employer's business, and which gives the employer possessing it the opportunity
to obtain a competitive advantage over businesses who do not possess it, or the
secrecy of which is certified... as necessary for national defense purposes"); Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (exempting trade secrets from federal
agencies' reporting requirements); John L. Spilsbury, Comment, The Hazardous
Chemicals Right-to-Know Act: Letting the Public Know What's Next Door, 64 N.C.L.
REV. 1342-43 (1986) (stating that defense related trade secrets are given double
protection).
77. E.g., Lyndon, supra note 33, at 1810-17 (discussing that information
regarding the effects of toxins or their use in combination often involves the use of
costly epidemiological data or modelling, the usefulness of which is uncertain until
after the information is gathered and analyzed); RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL
SOCIETY? 31-33 (Brian Barry & Russell Hardin eds. 1982) (discussing the manner in
which public goods and other factors affect the decision-making process); Lyndon,
supra note 33, at 1810-12.
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this economic disincentive. Moreover, the research data obtained are
subject to manipulation and the statistical data derived from these tests
may be incorrect. 8 If an entire industry is lax, the general standard
of expected research will remain low. Even if all firms attempt to
comply, right-to-know acts may discriminate against smaller businesses.
Often, large firms possess enough research and development funds
to analyze their factors of production. However, given the economic cost
of such research, many smaller businesses are deterred from complying
fully with these acts.7 9 To equalize responsibility and ability to pay, a
"super study" plan, modelled after the Superfund hazardous waste
cleanup program, could be developed to help subsidize research' and
to create a centralized computer database for use by companies
researching their production processes.
81
C. The Securities Exchange Acts: An Unutilized Source of Corporate
Duties to Reveal Information About Pollution Practices
The Securities Exchange Acts of 193382 and 19348 contain
regulations that could be used to restrain corporate environmental
behavior. These acts require that large, publicly held corporations
provide periodic information to their stockholders regarding their
financial health.' Officers of corporations are held personally liable
for omitting or misrepresenting "material facts" about the financial well-
being of the corporation to the stockholders.8 The regulations that
enforce management's duty to properly represent material facts could be
conceptually extended to the environmental realm.
Due to the rising economic costs of complying with increasingly
78. Lyndon, supra note 33, at 1816 n.78.
79. Id. at 1834.
80. Id. at 1837-41.
81. Id. at 1841-55.
82. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988)).
83. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78
(1988)).
84. Corporations with more than $5 million of assets must register issues with
the Securities Exchange Commission and make public periodic financial information.
See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS § 14.2, at 341
(1989).
85. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 875 (1968).
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stringent environmental regulations, a firm may amass costly liabilities
for environmental violations. The impact of regulations on the corporate
cost structure, legal proceedings, and the costs of compliance policy may
in fact be material economic factors." It follows that stockholders can
exert pressure on the officers of a corporation to behave in an
environmentally responsible manner out of concern for the stability of
their own investment or even concern for the effects of their
corporation's production practices on the environment. All information
submitted to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) or contained in
reports filed thereunder, are open to public inspection under the
Freedom of Information Act.87 However, several realities suggest that
the SEC regulations do not, as of yet, play a significant role in
environmental protection.
The limited scope of the securities regulations and the substantial
discretion afforded corporate management in corporate law, limit the
effectiveness of these regulations to promote environmentally sound
corporate behavior. First, many of the duties of the Acts only apply to
publicly held corporations. Many polluters may be closely held
manufacturing concerns. In addition, the board of directors of a
corporation is given wide discretion to determine what is in fact
"material." Because they are within their given industry, and therefore
more familiar with their production practices, corporate directors are
presumed by courts to be business professionals who know their
likelihood of economic success better than the inexpert court.ss
The SEC considered, but refused to impose, a broad requirement
of disclosure of environmental policy because it feared such a
requirement would result in "subjective disclosure incapable of
verification." 9 While such an environmental requirement may lead to
this effect, the financial regulations of the SEC are similarly
unverifiable. The allegedly concrete information in financial statements
86. DUTIES, supra note 36, at 42-43.
87. Id. at 50.
88. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup.Ct. 1944). To encourage freedom
of action, and discourage interference with the exercise of directors' independent
judgments, the business judgment rule leaves "[q]uestions of policy of management,
expediency of contracts or action, adequacy of consideration, lawful appropriation of
corporate funds to advance corporate interests . . .solely to their honest and
unselfish decision." Id. at 6 (quoting Pollitz v. Wabash R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113, 124,
(1912)).
89. DUTIES, supra note 36, at 43.
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are heavily manipulated and firms tend to shop around for the
accounting firm with the most favorable "independent!' opinion. It is
likely that the SEC's stated fear of the creation of additional
bureaucracy was supplemented by the influence of powerful corporate
regulatees who desired that the clause be dropped. Regardless, the SEC
does pledge to insure the accuracy of any voluntary disclosures."
D. The Common Law: A Limited Source of Duties to Disclose
Environmental Hazards
The common law imposes several duties on a corporation that aid
in environmental enforcement. There is a general duty to warn those
potentially affected by a harm one creates.' While a few plaintiffs in
environmental cases succeeded in the nineteenth century,93 the rulings
did not extend beyond the duty to warn entrants to one's business or
residence. In modern times, prior to the enactment of state and federal
statutes, information about polluting behavior was grossly misanalyzed
by the courts when they applied nuisance law."
Nuisance doctrine, which developed under British common law,
was used to protect the "quiet enjoyment" of residents near polluters in
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America. However, courts
were often influenced by the political and social prominence of industries
90. Omitting liabilities from the balance sheets, deviating from GAAP accounting
conventions, inflating or deflating asset or inventory value and a host of other
techniques are used to create a favorable financial picture. These practices are
referred to euphemistically as "creative accounting" or cynically as "flim flam in the
books." See HAMILTON, supra note 84, at § 9.14.
91. DUTIES, supra note 36, at 43.
92. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christians, 443 P.2d 561 (1968) (finding owner of
residence liable for failing to warn social guest of cracked faucet); Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (1976) (finding psychiatrist negligent for failing to warn
plaintiff that another patient had threatened to harm the plaintiff); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding
manufacturers liable for failing to perform tests and to keep abreast of ongoing
research), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); see also DUTIES, supra note 36, at 50.
93. DUTIES, supra note 36, at 50.
94. Id.
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in their communities." Legislation was therefore better suited than
nuisance doctrine to improve the general quality of the environment and
protect individual property rights.
E. Professional Ethics: The Corporate Professional's Lips Are Sealed
While duties exist to disclose acts or economic conditions which are
contrary to general standards of care, engineers, accountants, and
lawyers are restricted by professional policies which limit the extent in
which these revelations may be freely made. Engineers are required to
certify that they are designing and implementing safe procedures;
however, they are under no duty to disclose with specificity any
departures from safe practice 6 Accountants must certify only that
financing procedures and cost accounting relating to environmental
compliance accord with generally accepted accounting principles;9
however, as long as an environmentally harmful practice is entered into
the books correctly, accountants need not be concerned. A corporation's
attorney can only reveal information regarding future wrongdoing;
however, knowledge of past violations is privileged information and may
not be revealed.9" It is politically unlikely that any of these groups
would accept an "environmental exception" to their traditional
professional responsibilities.
95. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453 (1886). In its decision,
the court noted that although defendant coal mining company was negligent in
polluting water on plaintiffs' land, thereby diminishing the value of the land,
"[plaintiffs'] personal inconveniences.., must yield to the necessities of... great
public industry . . . [Alithough in the hands of a private corporation, [such
corporations] subserve ... a great public interest... [T]rifling inconveniences to
particular persons must sometimes give way to the necessities of a great community."
Id. at 459.
96. DUTIES, supra note 36, at 35.
97. Id.
98. See generally MURRAY L. SCHVARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
72-79 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing decisions that define the scope of the attorney-client
privilege in criminal and corporate settings). The privilege is often used to ensure
the confidentiality of environmental audits. See Phillip D. Reed, Comment:
Environmental Audits and Confidentiality: Can What You Know Hurt You as Much
as What You Don't Know?, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,303, 10,307-08 (1983).
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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING: THE INCREASINGLY VOLUNTARY
PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH
The lack of environmental information transfering between
corporate America and its government regulators has not been a
function of the inability of polluters to monitor their production
processes. Companies have become increasingly sensitive to the
economic and public relations effects of environmental damage. As a
result of sensitivity, more than two-thirds of larger manufacturing
companies engage in voluntary environmental auditing."
Environmental auditing is generally an in-house evaluation
consisting of tests and verification of a plant's procedures and practices
with reference to legal requirements, internal policies, and accepted
practices ° In response to the increasing complexity of environmental
regulation in the 1970s, many firms established environmental auditing
programs to help meet the demands of environmental compliance and
to increase internal managerial control of their production processes.
Auditing assists companies in their efforts to comply with environmental
standards by providing data to determine compliance status and improve
environmental performance at the production level. To achieve these
goals, it is necessary to increase the "environmental awareness" of
operators responsible for compliance and to reveal where procedures can
be improved.0 1  In addition, auditing helps companies maintain
tighter control over their use of materials and identify potential
liabilities that could result from their business practices."
Audits are usually conducted by a "core corporate group" which
operate in a manner reflecting the firm's desire to either achieve
independence of the audit function or to emphasize accessibility and
familiarity with the processes to be audited. °3 The "core group" is
usually located in an internal audit department, an environmental
99. Reed, supra note 98, at 10,303.
100. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA
230-09-83-006, CURRENT PRACTICES IN ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING 1 (1984)
[hereinafter CURRENT PRACTICES].
101. Id. at 2.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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division, a regulatory affairs unit, or a legal department.'O° While
financial auditing has clear conventions and prescribed duties,
environmental auditing is a relatively new and fluid practice which is
guided by no uniform standards."°
Companies that have supplied information to EPA studies on
environmental auditing practices' have cited common benefits from
developing such practices. Firms with strong audit programs find that
their staff is more knowledgeable of their environmental compliance
duties"° and that this knowledge translates into higher levels of
compliance and a decrease in the number of pollution lawsuits.1° 8
Better relations with both regulators and the general public are also
achieved."° Auditing companies have also found that cost control and
management self-evaluation are more efficient and production processes
are more thoroughly understood." 0
Auditing is an efficient means of gathering information which
would be useful in the hands of regulators. If the regulatory community
had more accurate information about the production of pollution,
regulations and enforcement schemes could be more appropriately
tailored to production processes. However, an increase in information
sharing between the regulator and the regulatee is unlikely, given the
ingrained distrust of the government by the private sector.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the cumbersomeness, inflexibility, and underinclusivity of
state and federal pollution legislation, corporate America's distrust of
government regulators and the ideology of industry-government
separation dictates that statutes such as FWPCA and CAA will continue
to be the mainstay of American environmental control. However,
research duties applied by right-to-know laws illustrate that the
104. Id. (placing environmental audit responsibilities within the legal department
provides additional insulation of audit results from the scrutiny of regulators because
of the attorney-client privilege).
105. CURRENT PRACTICES, supra note 100, at 4.
106. See, e.g., CURRENT PRACTICES, supra note 100.
107. CURRENT PRACTICES, supra note 100, at 34.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 39.
110. Id. at 87.
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responsibility of assessing environmental risks can be successfully
delegated to industry. Therefore, further subsidization of such research
should be provided and equitably distributed.
The increasing development of environmental auditing signifies
industry's ability to understand its polluting behavior, but there has not
been a willingness to share that understanding with regulators. In
order to harness whatever gains in compliance techniques are being
developed with environmental audit information, flexibility and
confidentiality must be assured in order to coax .reluctant firms to
provide this valuable information to government regulators. Although
the EPA has shown some willingness to develop a nonadversarial
relationship with the private sector,"' it is unlikely that the Agency
will aggressively transform its rigid auditing practices." 2  Such
conduct only reinforces the EPA's eroding relationship with the private
sector. Therefore, the EPA should apply flexibility in its auditing, as its
policy statement implies.
" hat makes the political tensions generated by environmental
hazards so discomforting is not their violence . . . but, rather their
implicit questioning of the very political formulas that have bestowed
legitimacy on institutions and ideologies in a wide variety of
systems.""' To successfully address the pollution problems of the
future, ideological barriers must be lowered and an open relationship of
shared knowledge between the government and the private sector must
be established.
111. The EPA recognizes the chilling effect of using audits in enforcement and
does not routinely request them. See 51 Fed. Reg. 25,005, 25,007 (1986).
112. For example, the Agency does not promise to require a showing of
"compelling necessity" or unavailability of alternative information sources before
requesting an audit report. See id. at 25,005.
113. ENLOE, supra note 1, at 1.
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